The Iranian–Israeli Conflict: The Deterrence Structure and the Limits of Confrontation

Abstract

This article examines the nature of the conflict between Iran and Israel from the perspective of the deterrence structure and the limits of confrontation between the two sides in light of the Geopolitical shifts in the Middle East. The study aims to analyse the nature of the Non-reciprocal deterrence that has developed between the two sides, which relies on greater conventional military capabilities, Regional proxies and indirect operations. The study proceeds from the premise that the Iranian-Israeli conflict is not necessarily heading towards total war, but rather takes the form of a limited and controlled confrontation governed by calculations of mutual deterrence and regional balances of power.

The study employs an analytical methodology to explain the dynamics of strategic interaction between the two sides, focusing on the role of proxy warfare, limited strikes and Cyber operations in shaping the deterrence equation.

The study concludes that the existing deterrence structure between Iran and Israel has helped to reduce the likelihood of a large-scale direct confrontation, but at the same time creates a fragile security environment characterised by recurring crises and the potential for uncalculated escalation.