



The Role of the Financial Intelligence Unit in Combating Corruption and promoting the Achievement of Sustainable Development Goals

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Abstract: The Financial Intelligence Unit plays a pivotal role in combating corruption and money laundering, and indirectly contributes to achieving sustainable development goals by promoting transparency and economic stability. The following is a comparative analysis of Algeria, Morocco, France, and the United States. This study concluded that the Financial Intelligence Unit is affiliated with the Ministry of Finance in most countries, given its effective role in curbing corruption and achieving sustainable development goals by protecting public funds from misuse and embezzlement through illicit means such as money laundering.

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1. Introduction

The roots of financial intelligence units trace back to the economic and security transformations the world witnessed in the late 1980s. In 1990, the United States established **the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)** pursuant to a decision by the U.S. Department of the Treasury⁽¹⁾. This establishment came in response to the rise in money laundering resulting from drug trafficking and organized crime. FinCEN served as a pioneering model in the field of anti-money laundering, as it was designed as a financial intelligence agency combining financial analysis with cooperation among various government agencies². The network focused on collecting and analyzing financial information from banking and financial institutions, then providing this information to law enforcement and judicial authorities

Following the success of the U.S. model, other countries began adopting the idea of establishing specialized financial intelligence units. In 1991, **Australia** established AUSTRAC (Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre). **France** followed in 1990 with the creation of TRACFIN (Traitement du Renseignement et Action contre les Circuits Financiers clandestins)

During the 1990s, the world witnessed a widespread proliferation of these units, with **Canada** establishing FINTRAC in 2000 and **the United Kingdom** establishing the National Crime Agency (NCA), which includes the Financial Intelligence Unit⁽³⁾. In the Middle East and North Africa, countries such as **the United Arab Emirates** (2002), **Morocco** (2009), and **Algeria** (2002) began establishing their own units.

Several factors combined to push the international community toward the establishment of financial intelligence units :

First: The rise of money laundering—The 1980s and 1990s saw a marked increase in the volume of illicit funds generated by drug trafficking, organized crime, and corruption, necessitating the creation of effective mechanisms to combat them⁴.

Second : Financial globalization—The liberalization of financial markets and the development of communication and technology facilitated the cross-border movement of funds, making it difficult for traditional agencies to track suspicious transactions.

Third : International Pressure – International organizations such as **the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)**, established in 1989, played a pivotal role in pushing countries to establish financial intelligence units as part of anti-money laundering standards.

Fourth : Security Threats - Especially after the events of September 11, 2001, countering terrorist financing became a top priority, reinforcing the need for specialized units capable of monitoring suspicious financial flows.

Chapter One : Financial Intelligence Units—Institutional Structure

Section 1 : The Origin and Development of Financial Intelligence Units

Subsection 1 : Historical Context of Establishment

- **The Historical Evolution of the Concept of Units**

The concept of Financial Intelligence Units has undergone several stages of development :

Phase I (1990–1995): The Founding Phase – This phase was characterized by experimentation and the search for the best organizational models, as the number of cells was limited and they focused primarily on data collection⁵.

Phase Two (1995–2001) : Expansion and International Coordination – This period saw the establishment of the Egmont Group in 1995, which provided the units with a framework for international cooperation and the exchange of expertise.

Phase Three (2001–2010) : Focus on Countering Terrorist Financing – Following the September 11 attacks, the units' mandates expanded to include monitoring and countering terrorist financing, while their analytical and technical capabilities were strengthened

Phase Four (2010–present) : Digital Transformation and Artificial Intelligence – Characterized by the introduction of advanced technologies such as big data analysis, artificial intelligence, and machine learning into financial analysis processes

Subsection Two : The Egmont Group

1. Establishment and Objectives (1995):

In June 1995, representatives of financial intelligence units from several countries met at **the Egmont-Arenberg Palace** in Brussels, Belgium, and founded what became known as **the Egmont Group**.⁶ This establishment came in response to the growing need to create an informal forum bringing together financial intelligence units from various countries to enhance cooperation and information exchange.

The main objectives of the Egmont Group are :

- **Providing a platform for the secure exchange of information** among member financial intelligence units.
- **Developing standards and best practices** in the field of combating money laundering and terrorist financing.
- **Strengthening the analytical capabilities** of financial intelligence units through training and the exchange of expertise.
- **Supporting countries in establishing and developing** their own financial intelligence units.

2. Membership and Requirements

As of 2024, the Egmont Group had more than **166** member **FIUs** from around the world⁷. Membership is subject to strict criteria that ensure effective cooperation, the most important of which are :

- **Legal Recognition** : The unit must be established under national law and exercise its functions officially
- **Operational independence** : The unit must enjoy a degree of independence in its work without undue political interference
- **Capacity to receive suspicious activity reports** : The unit must serve as a central national point for receiving and processing reports related to suspicious transactions.
- **Confidentiality protection** : Adherence to strict standards for protecting exchanged information.
- **Ability to exchange information** : A legal framework must exist that allows for the exchange of information with foreign units.

3. Egmont Secure Web (ESW)

The Egmont Group established **the Egmont Secure Web (ESW)** as an encrypted electronic platform that allows its members to communicate and exchange information securely and quickly⁸. This network represents one of the Group's most significant achievements, as :

- **Facilitates the immediate exchange of information** between financial intelligence units around the clock.
- **Provides advanced search tools that** allow members to access shared databases.
- **Ensures a high level of cybersecurity** through advanced encryption protocols.
- **Enables the exchange of documents and files** related to suspicious cases.

4. Information exchange among units

Information exchange is at the heart of the Egmont Group's work and is conducted according to specific principles :

The principle of reciprocity: Exchange is based on mutual cooperation between units ⁽⁹⁾

The request-and-response principle : Information is exchanged based on specific requests or automatically in certain cases

Restrictions on use: Exchanged information must be used only for the specified purposes and may not be transferred to third parties without the consent of the sending authority

Memoranda of Understanding : The Group encourages its members to sign bilateral or multilateral memoranda of understanding to regulate cooperation mechanisms.

5. Regular Meetings and Conferences

The Egmont Group organizes several periodic events :

Annual General Meeting: Held once a year, it brings together representatives of all member units to discuss developments and challenges and formulate strategies ¹⁰

Regional Committee Meetings : The Group is divided into six regional groups (Asia-Pacific, Europe, the Americas, Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and Eurasia), each of which holds its own meetings

Steering Committee Meetings : Meet regularly to manage the group's day-to-day affairs

Training workshops and seminars : Organized periodically to develop members' capabilities and share best practices

Subsection 3 : Organizational Models of Financial Intelligence Units

Countries adopt different organizational models for financial intelligence units based on their specific legal, administrative, and security contexts. The Egmont Group classifies these models into four main types :

1. Administrative Model : Affiliated with the Ministry of Finance or the Central Bank

General Characteristics :

The administrative model is characterized by the financial intelligence unit's subordination to an administrative body such as the Ministry of Finance, the central bank, or an independent financial authority. These units focus on the financial and economic analysis of suspicious transactions without possessing direct enforcement powers¹¹.

Advantages :

- **Financial expertise :** Leveraging the financial and economic expertise available within financial institutions
- **Access to banking data :** Easy access to financial and banking information
- **Impartiality :** Relative independence from security and political pressures
- **Specialization :** Focus on technical analysis without engaging in law enforcement

Disadvantages :

- **Limited authority :** Inability to take direct enforcement actions
- **Bureaucratic delays :** You may encounter administrative red tape
- **Difficult coordination :** Coordination with security and judicial authorities may be more complicated

Examples :

France - TRACFIN : Established in 1990 and reporting to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, it is characterized by advanced analytical capabilities and focuses on strategic financial analysis

Algeria - CTRF (Financial Intelligence Unit) : Established under Law No. 05-01 dated February 6, 2005, and reporting to the Minister of Finance, it is responsible for receiving and processing reports of suspicious activity and referring cases to the Public Prosecutor's Office¹².

United Arab Emirates - Financial Intelligence Unit : Reports to the Central Bank and focuses on

supervisory and analytical aspects

2. **Judicial Model : Under the Public Prosecutor's Office**

General Characteristics :

In this model, the Financial Intelligence Unit is subordinate to the judiciary or the Public Prosecution, granting it broader investigative and procedural powers¹³.

Characteristics and features :

- **Proximity to the judicial process** : ease of converting analyses into judicial investigations
- **Procedural Powers** : Ability to take precautionary measures quickly
- **Legal authority** : Leveraging the judiciary's power to compel entities to cooperate
- **Speed of response** : Reducing the time between detection and prosecution

Examples :

Belgium - CTIF (Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financières) : Established in 1993 and reporting to the Public Prosecutor's Office, it has broad powers in the field of financial investigation and inquiry.

Italy - UIF : Maintains close ties with the judiciary while preserving its independence

3. **Security Model : Affiliated with the police or security agencies**

Nature and Powers :

This model places the financial intelligence unit under the supervision of law enforcement agencies such as the police, gendarmerie, or specialized security agencies (¹⁴).

Features :

- **Investigative capabilities** : Leveraging the investigative capabilities of security agencies
- **Rapid response** : Ability to act quickly in emergency situations
- **Security Coordination** : Ease of coordination with other security agencies
- **Investigative expertise** : Leveraging the expertise of investigators in organized crime

Examples :

Netherlands - FIU-Nederland : Formerly part of the National Police before becoming independent

Norway - ØKOKRIM : The National Police's Economic and Environmental Crime Unit

4. **Hybrid Model : Combining more than one model**

Practical cases :

Some countries have adopted hybrid models that combine features of the previous models, with the aim of leveraging the advantages of each model and avoiding their shortcomings¹⁵.

United Kingdom : The National Crime Agency (NCA) combines security and administrative functions, possessing broad powers and collaborating with various agencies

Canada - FINTRAC : It enjoys administrative independence while maintaining close ties with security and judicial agencies

Spain - SEPBLAC : Affiliated with the Bank of Spain but cooperates closely with judicial and security agencies

Section Two : Legal and Regulatory Framework

Subsection 1 : Founding Legislation

1. National Laws on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing :

National laws constitute the fundamental legal framework for the establishment and operation of financial intelligence units. These laws typically include:¹⁶

Legal definitions : a precise definition of the concepts of money laundering, terrorist financing, suspicious transactions, and persons subject to reporting obligations.

Predicate Offenses : A list of crimes considered sources of illicit funds (drug trafficking, corruption, smuggling, fraud, etc.)

Criminalization and penalties : provisions for criminal penalties for perpetrators of money laundering and terrorist financing, ranging from fines to imprisonment.

Preventive Obligations : Imposing obligations on financial institutions and non-financial businesses (vigilance, customer identification, record-keeping, reporting of suspicious activity).

Institutional framework : Establishing a financial intelligence unit and defining its functions and powers

Examples of national legislation :

- **Algeria** : Law No. 05-01 of February 6, 2005, on the Prevention and Combating of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing¹⁷.
- **Morocco** : Law No. 43.05 on Combating Money Laundering.
- **France** : Monetary and Financial Code, specifically Articles L561-1 through L561-50.
- **Egypt** : Law No. 80 of 2002 on Combating Money Laundering.

2. Implementing Decrees :

Implementing decrees detail and enforce the basic laws, and address¹⁸ :

Procedural details : how to file suspicious activity reports, reporting forms, and time limits.

Internal organization : the unit's organizational structure, composition of the board of directors, appointment mechanisms.

Regulated Entities : Expansion or refinement of the list of institutions and professions required to file reports.

Financial thresholds : Determining the amounts that require special oversight or mandatory reporting.

Example : In Algeria, Executive Decree No. 06-05 dated January 9, 2006, defines the organization and operations of the Financial Intelligence Unit.

3. Decisions and regulatory regulations :

These decisions are issued by the relevant authorities (Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, the unit itself) to regulate specific technical aspects :

Vigilance criteria: Identification of indicators of suspicious transactions¹⁹

Customer Identification Procedures : Required Documents, Verification Methods, Special Cases

Internal Control : Internal Control System Requirements for Regulated Institutions

Periodic Reports : Forms and Deadlines for Annual or Periodic Reports

4. Ministerial Instructions and Circulars

Issued to guide practical implementation and clarify the application of legal provisions²⁰ :

Interpretative guidelines : Explanation of how to apply certain ambiguous provisions.

List Updates : Lists of Suspicious or Sanctioned Persons and Entities.

Best Practices : Recommendations on the best ways to implement legal obligations.

Alerts : Issuing warnings about new patterns of money laundering or terrorist financing.

5. Complementary Judicial Precedents :

The judiciary plays an important role in interpreting and enriching the legal framework through²¹ :

Interpretation of texts : Clarifying ambiguous legal concepts (such as "knowledge of the source of funds" or "reasonable suspicion").

Defining the scope of criminalization : establishing the boundaries between criminal and lawful acts.

Guarantees of the right to defense : Ensuring a balance between the effectiveness of crime prevention and respect for fundamental freedoms.

Case law : Building a body of judicial precedent to guide the work of units and subordinate agencies.

Subsection two : Institutional Independence and Accountability

1. Financial and Administrative Independence :

The independence of the Financial Intelligence Unit is one of the fundamental principles emphasized by international standards, particularly the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (²² , FATF).

Legal Personality :

Granting the unit independent legal personality means it has the capacity to:²³

- **Contract in its own name** : Enter into cooperation agreements, commercial contracts, and hire staff.
- **Litigate** : File lawsuits or defend itself in court.
- **Dispose of its assets** : Manage its property and assets independently.

Independent Budget :

- **Allocate sufficient financial resources** : Ensure the necessary budget is available to perform tasks without financial dependencies that hinder operations.

- **Independence in spending** : Freedom to set spending priorities according to the operational unit's needs.

- **Diverse funding sources** : May include government grants, administrative fees, or fines.

Dedicated human resources :

- **Direct hiring** : The ability to hire specialized talent without going through lengthy administrative procedures.

- **Competitive incentives and compensation** : Offering salaries and benefits that attract top talent.

- **Customized Training Programs** : Designing and implementing professional development plans tailored to business needs.

2. Relationship with supervisory authorities :

Despite their autonomy, the units remain subject to a form of oversight by the supervisory authorities²⁴ .

Administrative Oversight :

- **Senior appointments** : Appointments of the general director or head of the unit are often subject to the approval of the supervisory authority (minister, prime minister).

- **Approval of internal regulations** : Some organizational decisions may require the supervisory authority's approval.

- **Budget Approval** : In some systems, the budget is submitted to the supervisory authority for approval.

Periodic reports :

- **Annual Report** : Preparation of a comprehensive report on the unit's activities, statistics, challenges, and recommendations.

- **Ad hoc reports** : Notifying the supervisory authority of exceptional circumstances or significant developments.

- **Evaluation and review** : The unit undergoes periodic evaluations by internal or external entities.

Coordination and cooperation :

- **Regular Meetings** : Hold periodic meetings with the supervisory authority to discuss policies and priorities.

- **Participation in National Strategies** : Engaging in the development and implementation of national strategies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

- **Information sharing** : Providing statistical data and general (non-confidential) information to the supervisory authority.

3. Guarantees of operational independence²⁵:

Protection from interference :

- **Non-interference in individual decisions** : The supervisory authority has no right to interfere in the unit's decisions regarding specific cases.

- **Legal protection for staff** : Legal provisions protecting unit members from undue pressure and accountability.

- **Fixed Term of Office for the Director** : Appointment of the director for a fixed term without the possibility of arbitrary dismissal.

Freedom of decision-making :

- **Discretionary authority** : The ability to assess the seriousness of allegations and make appropriate decisions (follow-up, close, or refer).

- **Prioritization** : Identifying priority cases and areas deserving greater focus.

- **Analytical methodologies** : Freedom to adopt appropriate analytical methods and techniques.

Confidentiality and professionalism :

- **Commitment to absolute confidentiality** : Protecting sensitive information from unauthorized disclosure.

- **Non-disclosure of statements** : Prohibition against informing the person concerned about the statement regarding the suspicion to avoid compromising investigations.

- **Professional ethics** : Establishing strict codes of conduct and ethics for unit staff.

Subsection Three : Internal Organizational Structure :

1. Leadership Structures :

Head/Director:²⁶

- **Appointment** : The head or director of the unit is typically appointed by presidential or ministerial decree, taking into account criteria of competence and experience.
- **Term** : The term of office (3–5 years) is usually specified by law and may be renewable or non-renewable to ensure stability.
- **Powers** : The head enjoys broad powers, including :
 - Day-to-day management of the unit.
 - Making strategic decisions.
 - Representing the unit before national and international bodies.
 - Signing agreements and memoranda of understanding.
 - Approving the referral of cases to the Public Prosecutor’s Office.

Board of Directors:²⁷

- **Composition** : Typically consists of representatives from various relevant entities :
 - Representatives from the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank.
 - Representatives from the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior.
 - Representatives from regulatory bodies (Court of Auditors, financial oversight agencies).
 - Independent experts in the financial and legal fields
- **Responsibilities** :
 - Setting the unit’s general policy.
 - Approving the budget and annual reports.
 - Proposing legislative and regulatory amendments.
 - Overseeing overall performance without interfering in operational activities.

Specialized Technical Committees:²⁸

- **Analysis Committee** : Examines complex cases and provides technical recommendations.
- **International Cooperation Committee** : Coordinates international information exchange.
- **Evaluation and Oversight Committee** : Reviews the extent to which regulated entities comply with legislation.
- **Research and Studies Committee** : Conducts studies on money laundering patterns and evolving threats.

2. Operational Divisions :

Analysis and Processing Division :

Considered the beating heart of the unit, it is responsible for:²⁹

- **Receiving Reports** : Receiving reports of suspicious activity from regulated institutions.
- **Initial Screening** : Assessing the seriousness of the suspicion and prioritizing cases.
- **Financial Analysis** : Detailed examination of financial transactions and cash flows.
- **Linking information** : Identifying connections between different transactions or suspicious individuals.
- **Reporting** : Drafting comprehensive analytical reports to support decision-making.

Inquiries and Investigations Division:³⁰

- **Gathering Additional Information** : Requesting additional information from banks and financial institutions.
- **Accessing databases** : Querying national databases (commercial registry, tax, customs).
- **Field investigations** : In some systems, the unit may conduct limited field investigations.
- **Coordination with security agencies** : Cooperating with the police and gendarmerie to obtain security information.

Legal Affairs Division:³¹

- **Legal Consultations** : Providing legal advice to various sections of the unit
- **Preparation of referral memoranda** : Drafting files to be referred to the Public Prosecutor’s Office in a legally sound manner.

- **Monitoring legislative developments** : Tracking national and international legal amendments.
- **Appeals and Disputes** : Representing the Unit in legal disputes when necessary.

International Cooperation Division:³²

- **Information Exchange** : Managing information requests to and from foreign intelligence units.
- **Memoranda of Understanding** : Negotiating and signing bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreements.
- **International Representation** : Participating in meetings and conferences of the Egmont Group and international organizations.
- **International Training** : Coordinating training programs and technical assistance

Information Technology and Systems Division:³³

- **Technical Infrastructure** : Managing servers, networks, and secure communication systems.
- **Application Development** : Building and maintaining custom information systems for analysis and management.
- **Cybersecurity** : Protecting sensitive information from breaches and cyberattacks.
- **Big Data Analysis** : Using artificial intelligence and machine learning techniques to detect suspicious patterns.
- **Electronic Archiving** : Managing large databases and ensuring easy access to information.

Administrative and Financial Department :

- **Human Resources Management** : Recruitment, training, performance evaluation, and promotions.
- **Finance** : Budgeting, accounting, procurement, and contracts.
- **Logistics** : Providing offices, equipment, and transportation.
- **Archives and Documentation** : Secure and organized storage of paper and electronic files.

3. **Human Resources**³⁴:

Recruitment and Training :

- **Strict hiring standards** : thorough background checks, aptitude tests, and multiple interviews.
- **Core training** : An intensive training program for new hires covering legal, financial, and technical aspects.
- **Specialized training** : Advanced courses in financial analysis, investigations, and cybersecurity.

Required skills :

- **Financial Analysts** : Specialists in accounting, auditing, and financial and economic analysis
- **Legal professionals** : Lawyers and former judges to understand complex legal issues.
- **Investigators** : Experts in criminal investigations and financial intelligence.
- **IT professionals** : Programmers, data analysts, cybersecurity experts.
- **Translators** : Given the international nature of the work, foreign languages are essential.

Continuing Professional Development :

- **Periodic training programs** : Regular workshops to update knowledge.
- **International courses** : Participation in training sessions organized by the Egmont Group or FATF.
- **Exchange of expertise** : Sending staff to foreign units to learn from their experiences.
- **Academic research** : Encouraging staff to pursue graduate studies in relevant fields.

Section Three : Powers and Jurisdictions

Subsection 1 : Supervisory Powers :

1. Monitoring Compliance by Regulated Entities :

Financial intelligence units have broad supervisory powers to ensure that financial institutions and non-financial businesses comply with legal obligations³⁵.

Entities subject to supervision include :

- **Banks and financial institutions** : commercial banks, investment banks, and Islamic banks.
- **Insurance companies** : insurance and reinsurance companies.

- **Capital markets** : brokerage firms, investment trustees, investment funds.
- **Non-financial professions** : lawyers, notaries, accountants, real estate agents, precious metals dealers.
- **Casinos and auction houses** : due to their high exposure to money laundering risks.
- **Money transfer companies** : such as Western Union and MoneyGram.

Supervisory mechanisms :

- **Off-site supervision** : Review of reports and disclosures submitted by regulated entities.
- **On-site supervision** : periodic or unannounced inspection visits.
- **Risk assessment** : Classification of regulated entities according to their risk level.

2. Conducting inspections and examinations :

Inspection Powers :

- **Access to Premises** : The right to enter the premises of regulated entities during business hours.
- **Document review** : Access to all books, records, and documents related to financial operations.
- **Interviewing employees** : Questioning employees and officials to obtain clarifications.
- **Examination of Electronic Systems** : Access to databases and information systems.

Inspection reports :

- Inspection findings are documented in official reports that have legal standing.
- A copy of the report is sent to the audited entity, which has the right to object.

3. Request for Information and Documents³⁶:

Broad Right to Request :

- The unit has the right to request any information or documents it deems necessary for analysis.
- This includes information on :
 - The identity of customers and beneficial owners.
 - Bank account activity for specific periods.
 - Sources of funds and the destinations to which they are transferred.
 - Contracts and commercial agreements.

Obligation to Respond :

- Subject entities are required to respond to the Unit's requests within specified timeframes (typically 3–15 days).
- Failure to respond exposes the violator to administrative or criminal penalties.

4. Access to databases³⁷:

National

The Unit has direct or indirect access to:

- **Commercial Registry** : Information on companies and their owners.
- **Land Registry** : Information on real estate properties.
- **Tax databases** : Tax returns and income of individuals and companies.
- **Customs** : Information on imports and exports.
- **Criminal records** : Criminal histories of suspects.
- **Central Bank** : Information on bank accounts and financial transactions.

Databases:

International Databases :

- **UN Sanctions Lists** : Lists of individuals and entities subject to international sanctions.
- **Interpol** : Databases of internationally wanted persons.
- **Egmont Secure Web databases** : To search for information from foreign units.

Subsection 2 : Analytical Powers

1. Receiving and processing reports of suspected criminal activity³⁸:

Sources of reports :

- **Reports from financial institutions** : Banks are required to immediately report any suspicious transactions.
- **Reports from the liberal professions** : lawyers, notaries, and accountants upon discovering suspicions.

- **Reports from public authorities** : Customs, tax authorities, and the police may refer suspicious cases.
- **Proactive initiatives** : The unit may initiate an analysis based on open-source or intelligence information.

Suspicion

criteria:

Legislation and regulations define indicators of suspicion, such as:

- **Complex transactions with no economic justification** : Multiple transfers with no clear reason.
- **Use of intermediary accounts** : Routing funds through multiple accounts.
- **Large cash transactions** : massive cash deposits or withdrawals.
- **Transactions with high-risk regions** : Countries that do not apply anti-money laundering standards.
- **Wealth not commensurate with declared income** : Purchasing expensive assets without a clear source of income.

Receiving procedures :

- **Electronic platforms** : Use of secure electronic systems for submitting declarations.
- **Standardized forms** : Standard forms that facilitate automated processing.
- **Immediate registration** : Each declaration is immediately recorded in the unit's database.

2. Gathering Additional Information³⁹:

After receiving the declaration, the unit begins collecting additional Information :

Requesting supplementary information :

- From the reporting institution : clarifications or additional documents.
- From other financial institutions : to identify other accounts held by the suspect.
- From government agencies : information from tax authorities, customs, and public records.

Cooperation with law enforcement agencies :

- Request intelligence information from the police or security agencies.
- Secure information exchange that preserves confidentiality.

Database searches :

- Automated queries in national and international databases.
- Using network analysis tools to map relationships.

3. Conduct financial analyses⁴⁰

Types of analysis :

Tactical Analysis :

- Focuses on specific individual cases.
- Aims to determine whether the transaction actually constitutes money laundering.
- Involves tracing the flow of funds, identifying the parties involved, and gathering evidence.

Strategic Analysis :

- Examines general patterns and trends.
- Analyzes the sectors most vulnerable to risk.
- Provides recommendations to policymakers.

Operational Analysis :

- Links multiple suspicious cases to uncover criminal networks.
- Uses network analysis techniques.
- Identifies vulnerabilities in the financial system.

Analysis tools and techniques :

- **Financial analysis software** : specialized systems such as i2 Analyst's Notebook, Palantir.
- **Big Data Analysis** : Processing massive amounts of data to uncover hidden patterns.
- **Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning** : Algorithms that learn from past cases to improve detection.
- **Social network analysis** : Mapping relationships between people and entities.

4. Preparation of studies and reports⁴¹

Individual analytical reports :

- A comprehensive report on each suspicious case analyzed.
- Includes facts, legal analysis, and recommendations (dismissal or referral to the prosecutor's office).

Annual reports :

- Comprehensive statistics on the number of statements, referrals, and convictions.
- Analysis of new trends and patterns.
- Challenges faced by the unit and recommendations.

Studies on patterns and methods :

- **Sector-specific studies** : Analysis of money laundering risks in specific sectors (real estate, foreign trade, non-profit organizations).
- **Typology studies** : Characterization of methods used in money laundering.
- **National Risk Assessments** : Comprehensive country-level risk assessments.

Information dissemination :

- **Periodicals** : Issuing awareness bulletins for regulated entities on new patterns.
- **Public Reports** : Publication of redacted annual reports (without confidential information) for the public.
- **Participation in international forums** : Presenting studies and findings at Egmont and FATF conferences.

Subsection 3 : Repressive Powers

1. Temporary freezing of suspicious funds⁴²

Legal

basis:

Some legislation grants financial intelligence units the authority to freeze funds for a limited period (typically 48–72 hours, extendable).

Conditions for freezing :

- **Strong suspicion** : reasonable evidence that the funds are the proceeds of a crime or will be used to finance terrorism.
- **Risk of smuggling** : The likelihood that the suspect will transfer or conceal the funds.
- **Necessity and proportionality** : The freeze must be necessary and proportionate to the seriousness of the situation.

Freezing procedures :

- **Written and reasoned decision** : The head of the unit issues a decision explaining the reasons for the freeze.
- **Notification of the financial institution** : The institution is notified immediately to implement the freeze.
- **Non-notification of the person concerned** : To avoid compromising investigations, the account holder is not notified immediately.
- **Duration of the freeze** : A limited period (48–72 hours) during which either :
 - Lift the freeze if it is found to be unfounded.
 - Refer the case to the Public Prosecutor's Office for legal proceedings.
 - Request an extension from the judicial authority.

Judicial oversight :

- In most jurisdictions, the freezing order is subject to judicial review to ensure it is not abused.
- The affected person may challenge the decision before the courts.

2. Referral of cases to the Public Prosecutor's Office:

Referral

criteria:

The unit refers cases to the Public Prosecutor's Office when:

- **There is sufficient evidence** of a money laundering or terrorist financing offense.

- **Completion of the analysis** : following a comprehensive analysis and the collection of all available information.

- **The legal elements of the crime are present** : the material element, the moral element, and criminal intent.

Contents of the referral file :

- **Detailed analytical report** : explaining the facts, suspicious transactions, and parties involved.

- **Supporting documents** : copies of statements, account statements, contracts, and correspondence.

- **Legal classification** : Identification of applicable legal provisions.

- **Recommendations** : Proposal of specific judicial measures (investigation, freezing of assets, issuance of arrest warrants).

Confidentiality :

- The unit is bound by strict confidentiality and does not disclose information regarding the referral to the person concerned or to the public.

Case Tracking :

- The unit monitors the status of referred cases.

- It receives information from the Public Prosecutor's Office regarding the progress of investigations and trials.

- It use this information to improve its analytical work.

3. Participation in judicial investigations

Advisory role :

- **Providing technical expertise** : supplying investigators and judges with specialized financial analyses.

- **Explaining complex transactions** : Clarifying the technical aspects of financial transactions.

- **Providing expert testimony** : In some jurisdictions, the unit's analysts testify in court as experts.

Additional analyses :

- At the request of the prosecution or the investigating judge, the unit conducts additional analyses.

- Expanding the scope of the investigation to uncover accomplices or additional transactions.

Lack of Judicial Independence :

- In most jurisdictions, the unit does not possess judicial investigative powers.

- Its role is limited to providing technical support and does not involve conducting judicial investigations in the legal sense.

Cooperation with law enforcement agencies

Coordination with the police :

- **Information sharing** : Sharing information about suspicious cases.

- **Joint operations** : Participating in joint task forces to combat organized crime.

- **Joint training** : Organizing joint training sessions to strengthen cooperation.

Cooperation with Customs :

- **Monitoring money smuggling** : Monitoring cross-border smuggling of cash and precious metals.

- **Data sharing** : Information on suspicious imports and exports.

Coordination with tax authorities :

- **Combating tax evasion** : Money laundering is often accompanied by tax evasion.

- **Income information sharing** : Information on the income of suspicious individuals.

Joint committees and task forces :

- **National Anti-Money Laundering Committee** : Comprising representatives from all relevant agencies.

- **Specialized task forces** : to combat terrorist financing, organized crime, and corruption.

Chapter Two : The Financial Intelligence Unit in Algeria

Section 1 : Legal Background

Subsection 1 : Definition of the Financial Intelligence Unit in Algerian Legislation :

The Financial Intelligence Unit serves as an information hub regarding the informal or criminal financial sector, or as an independent administrative body whose mission is to combat money laundering and terrorist financing⁴³, by receiving and processing reports of suspicious financial and banking transactions, as well as proposing all legislative texts related to money laundering and its prevention. Article 2 of Executive Decree 02/127 defines it as:)) a public institution with legal personality and financial independence((. What is criticized about this characterization is its vagueness, as the abstract concept of a “public institution” contained in the unit’s definition is not specified in Algerian legislation.

Subsection 2 : Composition of the Financial Information Unit

The Financial Information Unit consists of a Board, a General Secretariat, **and administrative departments**. The Board pursuant to Article 10 of Executive Decree 08/275, amending Executive Decree 02/127, of seven members, namely: the President; four members selected for their expertise in the banking, financial, and security sectors; and two judges appointed by the Minister of Justice and Keeper of the Seals after consulting the Supreme Judicial Council. The President and members are appointed by presidential decree for a four-year term, renewable once.

In order to carry out its work, the unit may also call upon any person with expertise and specialization in fields related to the implementation of the provisions of the decree governing it, and it may exchange information with foreign bodies in accordance with the principle of reciprocity (Article 08 of Decree 02/127 (as amended and supplemented). Members of the unit and the persons they engage are bound by professional secrecy, even toward their original administration, and must respect the duty of confidentiality in accordance with Article 12 of Decree 02/127, as amended and supplemented.

Members of the unit who have not previously taken an oath in the course of their duties, as well as employees authorized to access classified information, shall take an oath before the Judicial Council prior to their appointment (Article 4 bis 1 of Law 05/01).

Members of the unit shall benefit from state protection against threats and insults, regardless of their source,

to which they may be exposed while performing their duties, and they shall also receive an allowance in addition to their salaries.

The Unit’s Council assists with various administrative and technical matters pursuant to the provisions of Article 15 of the Decree 127/02, and are established by a joint ministerial decree issued by the Minister of Finance and the authority responsible for the civil service, based on a proposal from its council. These departments are as follows :

* **The Investigations and Analysis Department**, responsible for gathering information and liaising with informants, analyzing reports of suspicion, and conducting investigations ;

* **The Legal Department**, responsible for relations with the Public Prosecutor’s Office and legal follow-up.

* **The Documentation and Databases Department**, which is responsible for collecting information and creating databases the data necessary for the proper functioning of the unit.

* **The Cooperation Department**, responsible for bilateral and multilateral relations with institutions and foreign organizations operating in the same field as the unit, which includes the Cooperation Office, the Press and Communications Office, and the Translation Office.

It should be noted that the unit’s organizational structure is characterized by flatness, and hierarchical levels are virtually nonexistent. This may have been intentional to ensure the rapid transmission and processing of information, while reducing decision-making centers and establishing the principle of consultation among the Cell’s Council members on matters referred to them, and leaving routine administrative tasks to the administrative and technical departments⁴⁴ .

Subsection three : The Degree of Independence of the Financial Inquiry Unit

Here, one can examine the extent of the unit’s independence from both an organizational and a functional perspective.

First : From an organizational perspective

Referring to the text of Article 9 of Decree 02/127, we see that the Information Unit is headed by a president and managed by a General Secretariat; it consists of: the Council, the General Secretariat, and the administrative departments. As the governing body, the Council has the authority to make decisions on

behalf of the Cell, while the General Secretariat and the departments perform technical support functions. Understanding the extent of the Cell's independence requires a close examination of its structure. The Cell's Council is composed, pursuant to Article 10 of Decree 02/127, as amended by Decree 08/275, of seven members.

- Chairperson.

- Four members selected based on their expertise in banking, finance, and security.

- Two judges appointed by the Minister of Justice and Keeper of the Seals, after consulting the Supreme Judicial Council.

This composition demonstrates diversity, as the members come from different sectors,

This is considered by legal scholars to be a safeguard for the independence of any autonomous administrative authority. As for the selection process, the selection of the four members based on competence in the banking, financial, and security sectors involves some ambiguity, which leaves discretion to the appointing authority. As for the judges, they are appointed by the Minister of Justice with the advice of the Supreme Judicial Council. This underscores the diversity of appointing bodies and methods, which is a factor that strengthens independence ; for if there were a single appointing body, independence would be limited. Furthermore, limiting the term to four years, renewable once, reinforces independence, because if they were appointed for an indefinite term, the appointing authority could remove them whenever it wished.

Article 11 of Decree 02/127 also affirms the independence of the members comprising the during their term of office from the institutions and structures to which they belong, and the conflict-of-interest regime established by Order 07/01⁴⁵ guarantees the independence of members vis-à-vis those who are required to report suspicions.

However, this independence remains relative, as the committee chair and some members are appointed by the President of the Republic through a presidential decree; furthermore, the fact that terms are renewable limits the independence of members vis-à-vis the appointing authority to which they remain subordinate, due to their fear that their terms will not be renewed.

B. From a functional perspective

In order for the unit to perform its assigned tasks to the best of its ability, which involves receiving, processing, and analyzing reports of suspected violations, it must have functional independence. This can only be achieved if it possesses the necessary authority to carry out its activities freely and without pressure, and if it has the autonomy to make the decisions it deems appropriate, either by referring the case to the judicial authorities once the suspicion is verified, or by closing the case if the suspicion is unfounded.

Referring to the text of Article 4 of Law No. 01/05, as amended and supplemented, it is clear that the unit is placed under the Minister of Finance. This raises the question of the extent of its independence from the Minister. Can he interfere in its work ?

With reference to the relevant legal provisions, particularly those contained in Law No. 01/05 and Decree No. 02/127, which amends, supplements, and regulates the work of the Cell, and upon analyzing their provisions, it becomes clear that the Cell enjoys independence from the Minister of Finance, who cannot interfere in its work; it makes its decisions at the level of its board, by a majority vote of its members, with complete freedom and transparency.

Among the other factors that reinforce its functional independence is its legal personality, which grants it the capacity to enter into contracts and litigate, as well as independent financial liability, It also enjoys freedom in managing its administrative affairs and human resources, noting that the head of the unit may appoint certain staff members, the secretary-general, and department heads.

Furthermore, the legislature's recognition of the unit's financial independence is an indication of its autonomy, as this requires it to have its own separate budget, which it manages independently ; the president serves as the authorizing officer, and the council deliberates on the budget.

Further evidence of the unit's independence is that its board's decisions take effect by a majority vote and do not require ratification or approval by any other body, nor does it submit any reports on its activities

and operations to any body, including the Ministry of Finance, indicating that the relationship between the cell and the Ministry is nothing more than an administrative one.

Nevertheless, this independence remains relative due to several factors, including :

-The unit does not have the authority to determine and organize its own interests, as this is done by Joint ministerial decision between the Minister of Finance and the authority responsible for the civil service.

-The unit does not have the authority to determine the salaries of some of its employees (the head of the unit, the secretary-general, the , and department heads).

-The unit relies solely on state subsidies for its funding, which places it in a subordinate position. Unlike in some countries, such as Belgium, where the unit relies on contributions from those required to report such as banks⁴⁶.

IV. Powers Granted to the Financial Intelligence Unit:

Pursuant to Article 4 of Decree No. 02/127 of , as amended and supplemented, the Unit is vested with the following powers:

* Receive reports of suspected money laundering and terrorist financing sent by persons legally authorized to notify the Unit, such as: banks, notaries, auctioneers, certified public accountants, brokers, customs agents, exchange agents, stockbrokers, real estate agents, billing institutions, dealers in precious stones and metals, and others.

* Process these reports using all available means and methods.

* Where appropriate, it shall refer cases to the regionally competent public prosecutor whenever it deems that the facts of the case warrant criminal prosecution.

* It shall propose all legislative texts relating to money laundering and the prevention and combating of terrorism.

In addition, certain powers are mentioned in other provisions, including those set forth in Articles 10 bis and 10 bis 1 of Decree 08/275, which amends and supplements Decree 02/127, such as :

* **Receipt of reports (suspicion notifications):** This is provided for in the first paragraph of Article 4 of Executive Decree 02/127:)) It shall receive reports of suspicion relating to all acts of terrorist financing or money laundering, which are sent to it by the bodies and persons designated by law((, and Article 15 of Law 05/01 also stipulates this jurisdiction, stating:)) The specialized body (i.e., the unit) shall undertake the analysis... as well as reports of suspicious activity involving individuals and entities...((, and the transactions subject to the framework of suspicion are divided into two types: First: deposits, transfers of funds, or securities transactions that exceed a certain threshold; and second: transactions that are considered suspicious for specific reasons, even if they do not exceed that threshold.

The declaration of suspicion includes all information necessary to identify the transaction, and the format of the report of suspicion pursuant to Executive Decree No. 06/05, issued in application of Article 20 of Law No. 05/01, which delegated this matter to regulation.⁴⁷

The report of suspicion must be written in clear handwriting, without any erasures or additions, by the report, whether manual or automated, must include, as applicable, the identity, description, and signature of the institution's representative at the Financial Inquiry Processing Unit, as well as the date the suspicious activity report was issued, along with the representative's handwritten signature. It must also be accompanied by all conclusive documents related to the suspicious transaction.

After receiving these notifications, the Unit records them in the existing database.

It shall, provided that the information is not used for purposes other than combating money laundering and terrorist financing, and is not shared with entities other than those mentioned in Articles 4 and 8 of Decree 02/127.

* **Examination and Investigation :** As provided for in Article 4 of Decree 02/127 :))

"Reports of suspicion shall be addressed by all appropriate means and methods," as stated in Article 15 of Law 05/01 ; "The specialized authority shall analyze and process the information received from the competent authorities..."

It is clear from the two preceding texts that reports of suspected money laundering received to the Unit are examined, analyzed, and investigated to verify their accuracy with the assistance of regulatory authorities

and other relevant bodies, such as by requesting specific documents from these bodies or accessing records or documents of interest ; professional or banking secrecy cannot be invoked against the Unit.

*** Notification of judicial authorities :** This authority is set forth in the third paragraph of Article 4 mentioned above, as well as in the text of Article 16 of Law 05/01 ; accordingly, after the Unit receives reports of suspected violations, it conducts an investigation and reaches one of two conclusions :

- A determination that there is no suspicion of money laundering in the financial transactions investigated, due to the absence of evidence of the crime, and consequently closes the case.

- Acknowledging the existence of suspected money laundering in the financial transactions it has investigated, and consequently referring the case to the competent regional public prosecutor, who in turn opens an investigation in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Code of Criminal Procedure⁴⁸ .

*** Taking precautionary measures :** The law grants the unit the right to take precautionary measures Pursuant to paragraph 4 of Decree 02/127 and Articles 17 and 18 of Law 05/01, a 72-hour freeze is imposed on any banking transaction involving a natural or legal person suspected of money laundering or terrorist financing, This allows for the freezing of the funds in question to prevent their owner from withdrawing them, with the aim of avoiding their confiscation and thereby preventing their laundering and reuse for illicit purposes. This measure is considered one of the most important means of preserving the proceeds of crime, which are believed to have an illicit source.

This measure may only be used in cases of strong suspicion, so as not to cause harm to persons suspected of money laundering, who may not actually be guilty, and to avoid abuse, given that the right to property is constitutionally enshrined under Article 52 of the 1996 Constitution. This measure may only be maintained by a judicial decision, as the President of the Court of Algiers may, upon request from the Intelligence Unit, After consulting with the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Algiers, the judge may extend the specified deadline or order provisional judicial custody of the funds, accounts, and securities that are the subject of the notice⁴⁹ .

Fifth : The Unit's Relationship with the Bodies with Which It Coordinates

In the course of performing its assigned tasks, the Financial Intelligence Unit is linked to a group of institutions and bodies, both internally and externally.

First : Internally

The Unit is linked to several bodies and institutions, the most important of which are : banks and financial institutions, administrative and judicial bodies.

1. The Unit's Relationship with Banks and Financial Institutions : Banks have a legal obligation to verify the identity and addresses of their customers, whether they are individuals or legal entities (Article 7 of Law 01/05). This is in accordance with the well-known principle of "Know Your Customer" (⁵⁰), as well as to report any suspicions to the Financial Intelligence Unit, while exercising caution and avoiding drawing the customer's attention during the investigation of suspicious transactions until the investigation is completed. The information must not be used for any purpose other than the primary objective of combating money laundering and terrorist financing, and members of the Unit must adhere to the duty of confidentiality and secrecy.

Professionals, even under their original management.

This cooperation between banks, financial institutions, and the unit will help protect the banking system from money laundering, as it discourages money launderers from risking large sums for fear of being exposed.

2/ The Unit's Relationship with Various Administrative and Judicial Bodies with Which It Coordinates :

The unit works in cooperation with administrative bodies that perform roles similar to its own in areas of The National Anti-Drug Office and the National Anti-Corruption Commission, It also receives confidential reports on suspicious transactions from the General Inspectorate of Finance, customs and tax authorities, and the Directorates of State Property and the Public Treasury (Article 21 of Law 05/01, as amended and supplemented, on the prevention and combating of money laundering and terrorist financing).

The Unit may also call upon specialized staff from these bodies to carry out investigative and analytical tasks (Article 6 of Decree 02/127, as amended and supplemented).

As for the judicial authorities, the unit—in cases where there is evidence of money laundering—can refer the suspect's file to the regionally competent public prosecutor for criminal prosecution.

Second : The Financial Intelligence Unit's Relationship with Specialized International Bodies

Article 25 of Law 05/01 provides that:)) The specialized body—the Financial Intelligence Unit—may share with the authorities of other countries performing similar functions the information it possesses regarding transactions that appear to be intended for money laundering or terrorist financing, subject to the principle of reciprocity((, and Article 26 of the same law provides that:)) Cooperation and the exchange of information referred to in Article 25 above shall take place in accordance with international conventions and domestic legal provisions applicable to the protection of privacy and the disclosure of personal data, provided that the competent foreign authorities are subject to the same duty of professional secrecy as the specialized authority.

From these two texts, we conclude that the Financial Intelligence Unit can exchange information with foreign authorities operating within the same framework in two cases :

* Either on its own initiative, when it deems that such information would be useful to in another country in investigating a suspicious transaction, or to facilitate the arrest of criminals engaged in money laundering or terrorist financing.

* Or upon request by similar foreign authorities, subject to the principle of reciprocity, that is, these entities must comply with requests for information from the Algerian Financial Intelligence Unit, which must ensure confidentiality and make proper use of the information⁵¹ .

The International Association of Financial Investigation Units, known as Egmont, is considered a key body in the exchange of information related to money laundering at the international level.

Sixth : Assessment of the Role of the Financial Intelligence Unit in Combating Money Laundering

In assessing the role of this unit in curbing money laundering, the following observations may be made the following :

* The legislature has placed its confidence in this body's ability to successfully perform its duties based on the experience and competence of its members,

The diversity of their specializations, and their effective use of technical and legal tools ; Relying on the expertise of bank employees facilitates the understanding of money laundering through banking and financial channels, and relying on the competence of police officers, the Ministry of Finance, and judges alleviates many of the difficulties in investigating money laundering operations and enhances coordination among the various agencies tasked with combating it.

* Although the unit enjoys independence in carrying out its duties, this independence is merely superficial nothing more, since it is in fact an administrative body subordinate to the Ministry of Finance, which limits its effectiveness and makes it vulnerable to various pressures and directives, especially if the individuals engaged in money laundering are influential and deeply entrenched in political power. Furthermore, ensuring that the unit possesses legal personality and financial independence guarantees the confidentiality of its operations and the independence of its staff.

* This unit cannot directly conduct searches, investigations, or inquiries into money laundering operations on its own; rather, it must be notified, which also limits its effectiveness, such that money laundering operations for which no notifications are received remain safe and outside of oversight—and this is, in fact, the prevailing situation⁵² .

* The material and human resources made available to the unit have been directed by the legislature to focus on combating the crimes of money laundering and terrorist financing; thus, they do not play a preventive role in curbing these two crimes, From this, we can conclude that the unit's role in prevention should be strengthened and that it should be provided with additional mechanisms enabling it to investigate crimes before they occur, particularly the material resources that would allow it to establish a comprehensive database on the activities and status of all entities relevant to its work, both domestically and internationally.

*The Task Force's efforts cannot be effective without a genuine commitment on the part of its partners to address and combat money laundering ; this requires those obligated to report suspected money laundering to fulfill their legal duty, and there should be voluntary cooperation in combating this crime.

*The unit does not play an effective role in addressing reports, and most of these reports originate from banks, which confirms that other financial institutions—which are required to report suspicious activity—are not fulfilling their obligations; This may be due to a lack of awareness among employees of these institutions regarding the risks of money laundering, the absence of any obligation to scrutinize transactions, and the failure to investigate the source of funds deposited by customers.

Chapter Three : The Role of the Financial Intelligence Unit in Combating Corruption and Achieving Sustainable Development Goals

1. Collection and Analysis of Financial Information:

- It receives suspicious activity reports from banks and financial institutions.
- It uses advanced analytical tools to detect patterns of money laundering and the financing of corruption.

2. Early detection of crimes:

- Monitoring of unusual transfers or unexplained transactions.
- Uncover financial networks linked to bribery and embezzlement.

3. Supporting judicial investigations :

- Providing financial evidence to judicial authorities.
- Contributing to the tracing and recovery of proceeds of corruption.

4. International cooperation :

- Exchanging information with similar units through networks such as the Egmont Group.
- Tracking funds smuggled across borders.

Its role in achieving sustainable development :

1. Promoting transparency and integrity :

- Reducing financial corruption boosts investor confidence.
- Improving the business climate.

2. Protecting the national economy :

- Reducing the shadow economy.
- Reducing the drain on financial resources.

3. Supporting the Sustainable Development Goals :

- Contributing to the achievement of UN Goal 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions)

Fourth : A Comparative Study of Several Countries

Algeria

- The Financial Intelligence Unit is affiliated with the Ministry of Finance but operates with functional independence.
- Faces challenges such as limited resources and coordination.

France – TRACFIN

- A sophisticated agency relying on technology and intelligent analysis.
- Strong cooperation with banks and authorities.

United States – FinCEN

- One of the most powerful agencies globally.
- Relies on massive databases and big data analysis.

Morocco – Moroccan Financial Intelligence Unit

- Has seen significant development in recent years.
- Strengthening international and regional cooperation.

Similarities and Differences:

Similarities :

- All units serve as a link between the financial sector and judicial authorities.
- They rely on suspicious activity reports.

Differences :

- Level of independence.
- Technical and human resources.
- Effectiveness of international cooperation.

Challenges :

- Weakness in reporting suspicions in some countries.
- Lack of specialized expertise.
- Evolving money laundering methods (cryptocurrencies, shell companies).

Recommendations :

- Strengthening the independence of units.
- Investing in technology and digital analytics.
- Strengthening international cooperation.
- Continuous human resources development.

2. Conclusions

In conclusion, it is clear that the Financial Inquiry Unit serves as a pivotal tool in the anti-corruption system, given the vital role it plays in monitoring and analyzing suspicious financial transactions and referring relevant information to the competent authorities for the necessary legal action. This unit also

contributes to enhancing financial transparency and promoting integrity within institutions by strengthening oversight and reporting mechanisms, thereby curbing financial crimes and bolstering confidence in the economic system.

On the other hand, the effectiveness of the Financial Intelligence Unit is not limited to combating corruption alone, but extends to supporting the achievement of sustainable development goals, particularly those related to good governance, building strong institutions, and achieving justice. The more independent and efficient this unit is, and the more it is supported by modern legislation and effective international cooperation, the greater its ability to curb illicit financial flows and channel resources toward investment and development.

Accordingly, strengthening the role of the Financial Intelligence Unit—by developing its technical and human capacities and intensifying coordination among various stakeholders—remains an urgent necessity to ensure a sound and sustainable economic environment capable of addressing the challenges of corruption and achieving comprehensive development.

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