



The role of prophetic tradition as a source of law in the political legitimacy of the Abbasids

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ABSTRACT: The dogmatic foundation of Islamic law began under the Umayyads, but its true fulfilment occurred under the Abbasids. The driving force behind this process was the preservation of the caliphate established during the Umayyads and the legitimization of the Abbasid leadership. The genius of the Abbasids was that they were able to shape the still immature, multi-ethnic imperial peoples into ummah, by authenticating Islamic law *post festum* through the Sunnah in a way that consolidated their power. Thus, jurisprudence could become the primary aid for political propaganda, which based its propositions on ancient principles that had primacy in the geographical zones of conquest. So the hadith seemed a more authentic source material than written sources, gained a key role. The collection of hadith material had helped to support the aspirations of religious and political parties since the 7th century, but its true power was harnessed by the Abbasids, thus creating a true past and form for the new, ethnically diverse ummah. The prophetic traditions caused a flexibility existence in the law, which consolidated the position of the caliph by Divine Law, that was further fuelled by adab literature and historical thinking through the cultural development of Islam. The great jurisprudential conclusion of the era was marked by the consolidated doctrines of the classical madhabs, the rigidification of whose legal principles was brought about by the very cult of hadith that initially meant flexibility and opportunity.

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1. Introduction

*"Know that this dynasty was one of the greatest dynasties. It administered the world by an administration combining religion with the state. The best and most upright people used to obey it from religious motives, and others out of fear, or through self interest."*¹

- this is how Ibn Ṭabāṭabā describes the Abbasid dynasty in his work *Al-Fakhri*, completed in 1301. And although ambition was strongly present in the Abbasids' endeavors from the very beginning, the key to their success was not only their good social organizing and political skills, but also their talent for understanding and seizing the moment. The moment in which, after the massive Arab-Muslim conquest, a mixed-ethnic society - embraced by an empire that was becoming organized within borders that had stabilized by the 8th century - could rise and become a true unity, an ummah.² This required defining the content of Islam and designating the custodian of hegemony.³ However, in order to organize a true Muslim society, it was also necessary to explain Islam dogmatically, for which the Abbasid rulers used three tools: the explanation of law, the elaboration of theological doctrines, and the flourishing of culture.⁴ However, Islam could not leave his Arab roots behind, as it was organically linked to the person of the Prophet, who was himself an Arab. Similarly, the Quran, which made Arabic the language of revelation, was also.⁵ So, unity had to be created in the multi-ethnic empire by simultaneously sacrificing the superiority of Arabism in society on the altar of organic unification into the ummah but preserving it with its dignity as a

¹ Ibn Ṭabāṭabā, *Al-Fakhri* – translated by C. E. J. Whitting, Luzac and Company Ltd, London, 1947, p. 134.

² Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, Gondolat, Budapest, 1989, p. 35.

³ Simon, Róbert, *Politika az iszlámban – A muszlim társadalom anatómiája*, Corvina, Budapest, 2016, p. 24.

⁴ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 79.

⁵ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, pp. 56-57.

substantive element of Islam. The Abbasids used legal means to achieve this. The key element of their strategy was the prophetic tradition, which proved to be both suitable for legitimizing their rule and for organizing a Muslim empire unique in history.

2. Inherited problems in the Abbasid Caliphate

The empire stretched from Spain to India by the 8th century, thanks to the conquests of the Umayyads. However, the vast empire struggled with internal problems. Increased distances made communication difficult, making the organization of not only the empire but also Islam problematic.⁶ An additional difficulty was that the caliphate absorbed numerous ethnicities, including languages, religions, and customs, which could easily have shaped the then-flexible Islam that created a wide range of religious and political parties.⁷ Dissension emerged, which the Umayyad government was not yet able to adequately handle, so the Abbasids had to face that.⁸

2.1. Islam as a tool

The borders of the empire, which had expanded during the Umayyad period (660-750), had stabilized by the last century of their rule, so the focus shifted from external difficulties to internal problems.⁹ Expansion steadily slowed, which brought to the surface the social and political tensions that had been channeled into the conquests.¹⁰ The expansion of the empire, and thus of Islam, has so far proven to be a unifying force. It is not surprising that Goldziher characterizes the state organization of the first four orthodox caliphs as a military organization.¹¹ The Umayyads inherited this spirit. Under their leadership, the Islamic Caliphate reached its maximum extent, but this led to the collapse of their power.

One of the driving forces of this process will be the tension rooted in the Arab-non-Arab conflict, which the expansion of Islam through conquest was able to absorb until it stopped. The only means of unifying the multinational empire that was born in a short period of time could then only be Islam itself, not its expansion.¹² The development of the Islamic religion primarily meant the organization of Muslim society. The early version of Islam was attractive with its spirituality, which was similar to Christianity and Judaism, but still immature. Its initial flexibility allowed for simple religious observance, which proclaimed its closed community while remaining open to anyone. Its easily acceptable nature triggered a wave of mass conversions.¹³

However, the Umayyad Empire was an Arab, not an Islamic empire. Although Muhammad's universal revelation placed Islam - by which the empire was created - above nations, it was organically connected not only to the Arab people but also to Arab traditions.¹⁴ And at the core of these traditions was the importance of genealogy. The genealogy that also linked Arabism to its Bedouin roots, and which was one of the most important identity legacies of pre-Islamic times.¹⁵ And the Umayyads represented this spirit, and its Meccan – not Medinan – views. For them, Islam was a means to legitimize their power, not its purpose.¹⁶ Islam was merely a common cause for the expansion of the empire's territory and thus their power. However, the Islamic empire as an organization did not interest them. They sought to Arabize the empire, not Islamize it. Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan's reform efforts were the first truly significant steps in this direction.^{17,18}

⁶ Hillenbrand, Carole, *Az iszlám – Új történeti bevezetés*, Kossuth Kiadó, Budapest, 2016. p. 118.

⁷ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, pp. 46-47.

⁸ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 54.

⁹ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, pp. 35-36.

¹⁰ Simon Róbert, *Iszlám kulturális lexikon*, Corvina, Budapest, 2009, p. 14.

¹¹ Goldziher, Ignác, *Az iszlám története*. Anno Kaidó, Budapest, 2000, p. 54.

¹² Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, pp. 56-57.

¹³ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 46.

¹⁴ Simon, Róbert, *Történetírás az iszlámban*, Corvina Kiadó, Budapest, 2019, p. 111.

¹⁵ Simon, Róbert, *Történetírás az iszlámban*, p. 104.

¹⁶ Goldziher, Ignác, *Az iszlám története*, p. 54.

¹⁷ The administrative tasks of the public administration and the drafting of financial documents are all carried out in Arabic. The inscriptions on papyri and textiles, which are under the economic monopoly of the state, are also all made with Arabic texts. He also carried out a monetary reform when he created the first unified Arab gold coin, the dinar, and the first unified Arab silver coin, the dirham, which, in accordance with Islamic principles, lacked human depictions but bore Arabic inscriptions.

¹⁸ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, pp. 44-45.

2.2. The mawālī¹⁹

The non-Arab Islamized population became increasingly significant in terms of the social balance of power in the empire. The most significant group of these is the group of mawālī who converted through client relationships, but at the same time are still outside the tribe due to their origin. The base of the mawālī group was formed by former prisoners of war and the nobility of the tribes of the conquered territories, who sought to maintain their previous social rank. The mawālī community was a diverse ethnic group, including North African Berbers and Sassanid subjects. The mawālī had reason to hope to gain a favorable social position through the client system and their conversion, but due to the disorganization of the public administration, they paid the same amount of taxes as the infidels. So, the tax system was therefore indifferent to the mawālī.²⁰ The rigidity of the client relationship, the discrimination and the reinforcement of Arab culture in the administration of the empire clearly treated the mawālī as second-class citizens, which gave rise to a great deal of dissatisfaction among them.²¹

2.3. The Legacy of the Abbasids

The social discontent that surfaced under the Umayyads could not be addressed by their government. The mawālī, who desired the respect and equality due to believers, found their calculations in the organizing elite of the Abbasids.²² The organizing movement originated in Khorasan, so it did not carry the insignia of Arabism, and in fact, in its first form, it seemed explicitly anti-Arab. However, this was not true, as Khorasan already had a large Arab population due to the expansion, and they also played their part in supporting the Abbasid movement. As the most strongly Islamized province, however, it also had a large population of Iranian mawālī, who were also supporters of the Abbasids.²³ Their calculations proved correct, as the revolution-initiated processes that could set the society of the Arab empire on the path to creating a Muslim community and statehood.²⁴ Thus, in the Abbasid Empire, the age of conquest was replaced by an age of integration into Muslim society, which created opportunities for non-Arabs to become true members of the ummah.²⁵

3. The emergence of the relationship of temporality

According to Assman, every culture develops something that creates its own *connective structure*. The essential element of this is a "symbolic world of meaning" appearing in a historical and temporal dimension, which connects the highlighted events of the past in the present while creating a common historicity. And shared historicity creates a shared identity, which, through shared knowledge and self-image, relies on shared rules, values, and memories of the now shared past.²⁶

The key, therefore, is the development of shared historical thinking, which, however, always develops for a reason. During the Abbasid period, the initiator of this process was the need to become an ummah, which also created a significantly new perception of time. The forming Muslim society searched for its common roots and genesis in the past. It was Muhammad's era that - as the most important Islamic epochal milestone - created the new social formation that could become exemplary for the re-creation of the ummah, which was already of imperial size.²⁷

It could not have been otherwise, as we find no trace of a state community in the region before the 7th century, and in fact, the history of the peoples living here before the 5th century can only be known from the records of other peoples. The pre-Islamic era, *Jāhiliyyah*, lies like a vacuum, like the Age of Ignorance.²⁸ It's no wonder, since the Bedouins had no unified historical consciousness, they were not interested in the lessons of the past, so they lived in a cycle of permanence. However, one element still served as a historical

¹⁹ Arabic *mawālī* مَوَالِي, plural *mawālī* مَوَالِي

²⁰ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, pp. 47-50.

²¹ Ibn Khaldun, *Al-Muqaddima* – Bevezetés a történelembe, Arab eredetiből fordította, bevezette és kommentálta Simon Róbert, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 1995, p. 25.

²² Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 69.

²³ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, pp. 62-64.

²⁴ Simon Róbert, *Iszlám kulturális lexikon*, p. 14.

²⁵ Simon, Róbert, *Történetírás az iszlámban*, p. 144.

²⁶ Assmann, Jan, *A kulturális emlékezet – Írás, emlékezés és politikai identitás a korai magaskultúrákban*, Atlantisz, Budapest, 2018, pp. 16-17.

²⁷ Simon, Róbert, *Történetírás az iszlámban*, pp. 91-103.

²⁸ Goldziher, Ignác, *Az iszlám története*, p. 3.

handhold. In my opinion, the reason for this lies in the level of social organization. Since statehood did not develop, the connective structure used by Assman is not worth examining at the level of common historicity and cultural memory that characterizes empires. However, there was a tribal organization that had its own time dimension. Central to this was the importance of genealogy, as it connected the individual to their tribe. There was no need for a stronger bond to create the community, as it was organized at a lower level than an empire.

The importance of genealogy is inherited into the Islamic world²⁹, as Muhammad's appearance, as the genesis of Islam, itself takes place in tribal society. However, it is precisely this contradiction, the universality of the revelation, and its truly Arab genesis, that will thwart the development of a real unified view of history in the Muslim world. Thus, regional and sectarian group views remain unavoidable elements of Islam, since the era of the Prophet becomes the standard of the ages as the only authentic period, so every moment of it has meaning.³⁰

The understanding of Muhammad's era as genesis therefore designates an ideal and therefore exemplary model in Islam that establishes the normativity of the Quran and the prophetic traditions.³¹ However, this had consequences that are closely related. One is that the era of the Prophet itself appears as an "*absolute past*"³² rather than as a historical past, so that the continuously advancing present always remains at the same distance from the moment of genesis. The causative character of history is thus lacking, as it is tied to a single point-like event on the axis of time.³³ Thus, necessarily always yearning for the Prophet's time, it can only create a cyclical process in which the glory of the past is desired, but at the same time unattainable, and it necessarily carries destruction within itself.³⁴

Since the appearance of the Prophet is the authoritative one, from the 7th century onwards there was a need for religious and political groups to somehow connect themselves with the era of the Prophet. The means for this will be the prophetic tradition, which, as common knowledge, gives certainty and credibility to the political and religious groups. In addition to legitimizing these parties, traditions also set them apart from each other, creating a specific religious-political image for each. This process is what Donner calls historicizing legitimization.³⁵

4. Prophetic traditions

4.1. The origin of traditions

Islamic traditions, like genealogy, are closely linked to pre-Islamic times. This can be understood not in terms of their content, but rather in terms of their role, thus their function in society and the legal system. During the era of Jāhiliyyah, customary law, itself rooted in tradition, was dominant in the lives of Arabs and Bedouins. Violation of its unwritten rules, like a code of loyalty, seriously undermined the honor. The customs of the ancestors, in addition to bloodlines, served as a bonding agent for the tribes, as the preservation of their customs united them through the dogma of loyalty not only in the present, but also in their common past. These traditional customs and institutions were called Sunnah³⁶ by the Arabs.³⁷

4.2. The revelation

²⁹ Simon, Róbert, *Történetírás az iszlámban*, p. 104.

³⁰ Simon, Róbert, *Történetírás az iszlámban*, p. 92.

³¹ Simon, Róbert, *Történetírás az iszlámban*, p. 93.

³² Assman endows the basis of historical consciousness, myth, with two aspects of historical vision. With the absolute past, which assumes cyclical historicity, since its starting myth serves as a model from which one cannot move away, but only yearn to return; and the historical past, in which myth creates a "hot society" in which the historical development itself becomes the central element, thus characterized by a linear historical development.

³³ Assmann, Jan, *A kulturális emlékezet – Írás, emlékezés és politikai identitás a korai magaskultúrákban*, p. 80.

³⁴ Simon, Róbert, *Történetírás az iszlámban*, pp. 92-93.

³⁵ Simon, Róbert, *Történetírás az iszlámban*, p. 113.

³⁶ So the Sunnah has several meanings. It originally referred to the traditions described above, and later, when the customs of the Prophet were authoritative, it became a term used to refer to a group of legal sources in Islam.

³⁷ Goldziher, Ignác, *Az iszlám története*. pp. 9-12.

In the age of barbarism, Islam brought moral order.³⁸ The Quran is primarily a revelation, not a code of law.³⁹ Nevertheless, it contains normative verses⁴⁰, although the number is very low – out of the 6346 verses, only about 500⁴¹ are legally relevant.⁴² The reason for this is that the Prophet found some of the living traditions suitable for the practice of the emerging Islam, so he did not need to create a completely new legal system. As a result, however, the Quran only mentions and regulates those behaviors in which Islam sought to deviate. The emphasis was on Islamic morality, so if it was not violated by the established practice, it could remain, and thus it was not included in the Quran.⁴³ The normative interpretation of the Quran is therefore closely linked to the person and time of the Prophet, and thus – as Muslim scholars themselves later discovered – requires explanation and interpretation.⁴⁴

4.3. Filling the legal gaps – The role of Sunnah and Hadith in the development of law

The need to fill legal gaps has therefore been a constant need since the creation of the Quran. However, the Prophet gained a deeper knowing and understanding of Allah's intentions, he provided guidance to the Muslim community through his actions and words. The legitimacy of this was given by the infallibility of his person⁴⁵ and by the Quran itself:

*“O believers! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger (...)”*⁴⁶

This is how the Sunna of the Prophet was born, which could not only survive through the mediation of the Companions⁴⁷, but could spread freely through the Companions who settled in different parts of the ever-expanding empire.⁴⁸

The real problems can be traced back to the period when the Companions also passed away, so the process of developing and preserving the Sunnah began before the end of the first century of Hijrah. For this, Muslims began to systematically document the events related to the life of the Prophet Muhammad in the form of hadith traditions.⁴⁹ However, there was a reason for starting the process other than preserving the Sunnah. Due to the size of the caliphate that was developing under the Umayyads, the long distances and communication difficulties made uniform legal interpretation problematic.⁵⁰ This was made more difficult by the fact that it was necessary to take into account not only the prophetic traditions, but also the still-living Arab traditions, as well as the traditions of the conquered territories and peoples, as these could hinder the development of a unified body of law. However, the Sunnah largely contains general guidelines that are not suitable for organizing an empire. So, when the development of the Sunnah begins during the Umayyad period, local traditions, as well as the actions of the caliphs and their governors, are used, thus creating “precedents” for organizing the empire.⁵¹

During the Abbasid period, improving living conditions resulted in a transformation of society, which also led to new demands regarding law.⁵² The Quran did not provide answers to the problems of a changing society, the organization of the empire, and the changes in land ownership, so traditions took on an increasingly important role.⁵³ Everyday legal practice began to move away from the Quran, which endangered the Islamic-based organization of the community. However, with prophetic traditions, it was

³⁸ Goldziher, Ignác, *Az iszlám története*, p. 23.

³⁹ Hillenbrand, Carole, *Az iszlám – Új történeti bevezetés*, p. 117.

⁴⁰ Jany János, *Klasszikus iszlám jog – Egy jogi kultúra természetrajza*, Gondolat, Budapest, 2021, p. 136.

⁴¹ Although Hillenbrand presumably relies on Hallaq's estimate, it should be noted that according to Coulson, the number of poems with normative content does not exceed 80. In.: Jany, János, *Klasszikus iszlám jog – Egy jogi kultúra természetrajza*, p. 137.

⁴² Hillenbrand, Carole, *Az iszlám – Új történeti bevezetés*, p. 117.

⁴³ Jany János, *Klasszikus iszlám jog – Egy jogi kultúra természetrajza*, p. 136.

⁴⁴ Duderija, Adis, *The Concept of Sunna and its Status in Islamic Law*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015.

⁴⁵ Jany János, *Klasszikus iszlám jog – Egy jogi kultúra természetrajza*, p. 139.

⁴⁶ Quran 4:59

⁴⁷ Goldziher, Ignác, *Az iszlám*, Magvető, Budapest, 1980, p. 129.

⁴⁸ Goldziher, Ignác, *Az iszlám*, p. 135.

⁴⁹ Duderija, Adis, *The Concept of Sunna and its Status in Islamic Law*.

⁵⁰ Hillenbrand, Carole, *Az iszlám – Új történeti bevezetés*, p. 118.

⁵¹ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 81.

⁵² Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 81.

⁵³ Goldziher, Ignác, *Az iszlám*, p.131.

post festum possible to authenticate proven legal formulas.⁵⁴ This not only made it possible to create a legal practice appropriate to the developing society but also created the means to solve the problem arising from the Quran's *ne varietur* system.⁵⁵ With this methodology, the revelation could continue to exist in its morally pure form, so that the legal material necessary for organizing the empire and an increasingly modern society - while leaving the values of the Quran unchanged on the surface - could develop along the legal variants created by traditions. Thus, in Muslim society, the Hegelian idea could become a reality, as "*the state is the realized ethical idea*".⁵⁶

The traditions were also applied in judicial judgment, but in a specific form due to the lack of a uniform interpretation and practice. This is how judicial practice produced the *ra'y*, which would be the personal legal opinion of the qadi, based on his own insight. However, since not only Arabs could be judges, the composition of the infiltrating traditions - Arab, local and Islamic - varied across the empire. According to Goldziher, this application of *jus non scriptum* is completely far removed from the traditionalist legal idea of the Arab spirit, so it was probably introduced into legal practice under the influence of the Iraqi school, in such a way that Iraqi practice, infected by Roman law, produced this instrument itself. Thus, similar to the *interpretatio juris civilis* method of the *prudentes judges*, Muslim legal scholars actually applied the *corrigere leges propter utilitatem publicanam* procedure when interpreting the prophetic tradition, based on legal fictions.⁵⁷

Unique insights led to unique results, which created contradictions within the traditional material, so the need for consensus (*ijmā*) soon arose. However, due to the large empire, *ijmā* was initially private in nature, regional in scope, and initially lacked sufficient authority. *Ijmā* - since it means agreement on the content and interpretation of the prophetic traditions - had to be infallible, just like the Prophet himself.⁵⁸ However, they may have varied from region to region, and since they were not recorded, they may have fallen out of use after a certain time. That is why J. Schacht calls these legal consensuses *living traditions*.⁵⁹

However, since the regional nature of *ijmā* and the criterion of infallibility were at odds with each other, the need arose to substantiate the authenticity of the traditions. In terms of authority, it seemed a good solution to seek the way of credit by the Companions, since they could provide a real basis for traditions by settling in various areas of the empire. As a result, every legal group or school cited a Companion who lived in the given region as a reference, and over time, the Prophet himself was even identified as the source of the tradition.⁶⁰

This is what Duderija calls the *hadithification* of the Sunnah, as the hadith becomes the classical form of preserving prophetic traditions.⁶¹ Goldziher himself holds a similar view, linking Sunnah and Hadith as form and content.⁶² Thus, a unified form of the hadith, consisting of two members, is formed⁶³: the first element is the support of the tradition (*isnād*) with the chain of narrators (*silsila*), and the second is the text, or rather the core or body of the tradition (*matn*).⁶⁴ Regarding the authority of traditions, the emphasis was placed on the first half of the tradition, the *isnād*, the transmission of which was always carried out with great care.⁶⁵

However, the mixing of traditions in the process of creating first *ra'y* and then *ijmā*, and the emphasis on individual aspects and interests, raised numerous questions regarding the authority of hadiths.⁶⁶ The hadiths were partially, and sometimes completely, forged to suit the interests of religious political parties.

⁵⁴ Simon Róbert, *Islám kulturális lexikon*, p. 166.

⁵⁵ Ibn Khaldun, *Al-Muqaddima – Bevezetés a történelembe, Arab eredetiből fordította, bevezette és kommentálta Simon Róbert*, p. 26.

⁵⁶ Hegel, G. W. F., *Philosophy of Right*, George Bell and Sons, London, 1896, p. 240.

⁵⁷ Goldziher Ignác, *A muhammedán jogtudomány eredetéről*, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Könyvkiadóhivatala, 1884.

⁵⁸ There were some jurists who did not consider the Prophet to be infallible, and so, in their opinion, the Prophet could err in minor matters. So, the Prophet may have committed actions that may have included some that were contrary to the will of Allah. In: Jany János, *Klasszikus iszlám jog – Egy jogi kultúra természetrajza*, p. 140.

⁵⁹ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 82.

⁶⁰ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 82.

⁶¹ Duderija, Adis, *The Concept of Sunna and its Status in Islamic Law*.

⁶² Simon Róbert, *Islám kulturális lexikon*, p. 166.

⁶³ Simon Róbert, *Islám kulturális lexikon*, p. 166.

⁶⁴ Goldziher, Ignác, *Az iszlám*, p. 136.

⁶⁵ Goldziher, Ignác, *Az iszlám*, p. 147.

⁶⁶ According to Cahen, due to the emphasis on verifying sources, traditions dating back to the Prophet have become the most questionable.

Their authenticity became unverifiable, and a plethora of false hadiths entered the public consciousness.⁶⁷ Soon, the traditionists themselves became the greatest patrons of the hadith, and the formula of *ra'y*, based on individual opinion, began to lose its authority. The goal became clear: every legal and theological decision had to be based on at least one hadith. In a developing society, this would have caused the law to become rigid, so the practice of the qadis gave rise to reasoning based on analogy, *qiyās*. In addition to the primacy of the Quran, a group of legal sources consisting of raw hadith, *ijmā* and *qiyās* was born. This is the *Ijtihād*, which is the legal endeavors of simple jurists.⁶⁸ Thus, under Abbasid rule, law acquired a flexibility that allowed state organization and jurisprudence to flourish.

5. History of Forgery

The history of forgery began long before the time of Muhammad and the Islamic revelation, in the age of ignorance, the *Jāhiliyyah*. Its central characters are poets, whose task was to preserve and convey the past. Their fabulous stories told of the tribes' illustrious genealogies, the heroic deeds of their ancestors, and the difficulties that sometimes arose. These stories connected the members of the tribe and reinforced their shared values in a kind of collective memory. The poems not only connected them, but also delimited and highlighted the given tribe from the others. Their prominent values, as the semiotic assets of the tribe, were instilled into the next generation through recitation and listening. The use of poetry in this form was of particular importance during this era, as *Jāhiliyyah* was the era of tribal rivalry and competition. And poets, as "creators of reality," could shape these relationships with their stories in such a way that what they said was etched into the collective memory from generation to generation. The poet, who was attached to the tribe or its patron - in exchange for protection and other compensation - immortalized the excellent character and heroic deeds of the tribe and its members in the desired manner, even if it was contrary to reality.⁶⁹

During the Umayyad period, poets broke away from the tribal framework and, moving to the cities, in government positions they no longer glorified the desert tribes, but the tribe, genealogy, and sometimes explicitly their political program of the rulers. Thus, the courtly institution of political propaganda was created.⁷⁰

It can therefore be said that supportive propaganda has deep roots in Muslim society. In my opinion, propaganda-oriented falsification, due to the importance and inheritance of genealogy, is passed down along with it - forming a kind of symbiosis - into later Islamic political life. However, its establishment in politics goes hand in hand with its appearance in religion and law, as in Islam these are inseparable areas. These are dimensions of social organization that are closely interacting with each other, based on Islamic revelation, but still integrating numerous traditional elements. According to Róbert Simon, religion, state, politics, and society can only be imagined as a variation of religious science in Islam.⁷¹

6. Hadith forgery as a tool and goal

During the method of transforming prophetic traditions into a source of law, I have already described the shortcomings that were evident in the Quran and later in the Sunnah. Their nature simply required the free shaping and possible falsification of traditions in the interests of empire and social organization. This, of course, does not mean that there are no originals among the traditions. In order to protect Islamic society, their collection began quickly, but only a small part of them was suitable for use as a precedent, so their transformation and falsification became a need. However, the counterfeiting took place in different forms and degrees.⁷²

The examination of these processes was initiated by the tradition-critical approach when Ignác Goldziher published his work *Über die Entwicklung des Hadith* in 1890. In it, he showed that the prophetic tradition was only formulated and given its form later, but he did not rule out the existence of a preceding oral material.⁷³ Islamic culture is - to use János Jany's phrase - "*inherently oral*". Its central element is

⁶⁷ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 83.

⁶⁸ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, pp. 83-84.

⁶⁹ Drory, Rina, "The Abbasid Construction of the Jahiliyya: Cultural Authority in the Making", *Studia Islamica*, 1996/1.

⁷⁰ Drory, Rina, "The Abbasid Construction of the Jahiliyya: Cultural Authority in the Making".

⁷¹ Simon, Róbert, *Politika az iszlámban – A muszlim társadalom anatómiája*, p. 21.

⁷² Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 83.

⁷³ Simon, Róbert, *Történetírás az iszlámban*, p. 100.

memorization and recitation.⁷⁴ The Sunnah itself was spread orally, and jurists also learned about it through oral tradition. This created a living connection between the reciter and the listener. Writing did not allow for such a degree of connection, and Muslims did not trust copyists and attributed much greater potential for error to preservation in written form than to oral traditions.⁷⁵

6.1. The first forms of forgery

The earliest forms of counterfeiting emerged not as tools for legal development, but as weapons of political warfare. Its legal history began in the time of the Prophet, when his Sunnah was still present as a real, living tradition in the everyday lives of the Companions and the early ummah. Muhammad's personality became the center of attention after the revelation, so it soon became a habit among the Companions to share with each other everything the Prophet did or said. Among these narrations, there were some that the Prophet himself declared false.⁷⁶ Early evidence of the forgers' activity is preserved in the fact that Muhammad himself warns them, since anyone who spreads lies about him will burn in hell.⁷⁷ The initial motivation can presumably be determined here too by individual or tribal interests.

During the caliphate of Umar, forgery had reached such proportions that the caliph had to ban the use of hadith.⁷⁸ During the years of Uthman's reign, hadith forgery had already demonstrably become a tool of political propaganda. Before Uthman's assassination, his political opponents tried to undermine his authority by using false hadiths, which the caliph tried to stop by banning hadiths⁷⁹ that were not yet known during his reign.⁸⁰

6.2. Fracture lines

The rivalries of the peoples and cities of the empire also found expression through false hadiths. The Syrians fabricated a hadith in praise of their country, the false nature of which is obvious, since their country only came into existence after the death of Muhammad.⁸¹ Similar to this is the hadith praising the city of Basra, which commemorates its distinguished residents and the best reciters of the Quran. Although the city was not founded until 635 under Caliph Umar, the hadith traces its lineage back to the time of the Battle of the Camel.⁸²

However, let us not forget that the subject of the transmission of the hadith is *the person*. And person, as an individual and as a social being, is in continuous interaction with his environment and social sphere. Interaction and influence are thus natural between groups. From this perspective, it can be understood that the propaganda aspect of the dissemination of hadiths is not necessarily only linked to religious groups, but also to Islam as a whole. One of the most important purposes of transmitting the hadith was to spread Islam itself. This could have happened at the level of a sect or religious political party, but a certain unity can still be observed in it.⁸³ The Kiramiyya sect directly permitted the poetry of traditions if their purpose

⁷⁴ The prominent role of recitation is preserved in the name of the Quran itself. The verb qara'a (قرأ) – as a root – means to recite. In: Wehr, Hans, *Arabic-English Dictionary – The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*. Snowball Publishing, New York, USA. 2018, p. 753.

⁷⁵ Jany, János, *Klasszikus iszlám jog – Egy jogi kultúra természetrajza*, p. 141.

⁷⁶ Jamaluddin, Idri – Jamaluddin, Arif, *Political Dynamics in the Hadith Transmission: Hadith Scholars and Orientalists' Perspectives*, Sunan Ampel State Islamic University, Surabaya, Indonesia, 2024.

⁷⁷ Brown, Daniel W., *Rethinking tradition in modern Islamic thought*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 93.

⁷⁸ Brown, Daniel W., *Rethinking tradition in modern Islamic thought*, p. 96.

⁷⁹ It is worth noting, however, that a group of Muslim scholars justify the ban on hadiths by saying that during the time of Uthman, the practice of prophetic traditions began to prevail over the use of the Quran, and the caliph used this tool to try to restore the primacy of the Quran. In: Azmi, Ahmad Sunasi, *The Influence of Abbasid Empire and Community Needs in the Development of Hadith Literature and Islamic Prophetology*. Faculty of Quranic and Sunnah Studies, Universiti Sains Islam, Malaysia, 2017.

⁸⁰ Nurudeen, Lamini, *History of Hadith Forgery*, Marmara University, Faculty of Theology, Istanbul. 2022, p. 10.

⁸¹ Goldziher, Ignác, *Az Iszlám*, p. 153.

⁸² Goldziher, Ignác, *Az Iszlám*, p. 155.

⁸³ Jamaluddin, Idri – Jamaluddin, Arif, *Political Dynamics in the Hadith Transmission: Hadith Scholars and Orientalists' Perspectives*.

was to preach Islamic morality.⁸⁴ So, *Machiavelli's theorem*⁸⁵ appears in Islam not only as a tool of the prince, but also as a tool of society. This turn of events gave rise to a whole new circle of forgers, the activities of the public entertainers (qussās), who performed their stories about the Prophet and his Companions in the marketplaces and other public places of the cities with the promise of making money. However, some of the qussās were forced by the caliphs to compose hadiths that would inspire respect and awe in their person, thus serving Islam.⁸⁶ However, the orthodox opposition warned people, and later, under the Abbasids, in 901 and 906, their activities of the qussās were banned in Baghdad. Records were made of the activities of the entertainers and the falsifications they carried out, with the help of which they tried to remove the hadiths they fabricated and spread from circulation.⁸⁷

However, the most important fault lines arose not outside Islam, but within it, because the political conflicts played a major role in the production of false hadith material. Many theological groups emerged as Islam entered a critical period of history after the fall of Uthman. Numerous theological-political groups fought each other.⁸⁸ The elite, divided into political factions, tried to legitimize their position with hadiths, as Muhammad himself did not designate his successor or the method of choosing the successor, and the Quran did not provide any guidance. So, to support their views, groups such as the Shiites, the Khārijites, or the faction of Mu'awiyah could only use fabricated hadiths.⁸⁹ The forgery only intensified during the Umayyads, who used the hadith as a means of supporting their rule, thereby actively spreading false traditions.⁹⁰

The Abbasids received as an inherited tool of hadith forgery for their political legitimacy. However, propaganda reached unprecedented proportions. The prophetic traditions they spread foretold each of their rulers. Yet, the weight of propaganda has increased not because of the number of forged hadiths, or perhaps their content, but through their use. It is worth clarifying that religious and ethnic conflicts became very serious during the Abbasid era, which also contributed to the spread of forged hadiths. This, of course, mutually increased the number of fabricated hadiths, as each religious and political group resorted to forgery.⁹¹ This resulted in a vast accumulation of hadith material by the 9th century, which threatened unity and the power of the Abbasids. Thus, the need to select hadiths arose, which gave rise to the first orthodox science, the science of hadith (*ʿilm al-ḥadīth*). This allowed the Abbasids to legitimize their power not only through propaganda, but also through the law.⁹²

7. The emergence of jurisprudence

The *ijtihād* created by the hadith paved the way for the development of jurisprudence, allowing madhhab to develop continuously since the beginning of Abbasid rule.⁹³ The role of prophetic traditions was evaluated by legal schools along the developmental arc of age-appropriate hadith practice.

The earliest surviving systematic collection of hadith is associated with the master of the Medinan school, Malik ibn Anas. However, when composing the *Muwatta*, Malik did not yet apply the formal standards of criticism later used to select hadiths.⁹⁴ He included in his collection those hadiths that were considered recognized in the city of Medina. The purpose of creating the *Muwatta* was to standardize local legal practice.⁹⁵

The madhhab of Abū Ḥanīfa - also known as the Iraqi school - came to be most closely associated with the government.⁹⁶ Of particular importance in the school's hadith practice is that, unlike the Medinan institution, they could not refer to local traditions as prophetic traditions, since the Prophet never visited Iraq. As a result, while in Medina we encounter a unifying legal practice, the renowned jurists of the Iraqi school developed their legal principles in parallel, without any one of them invalidating the other. This

⁸⁴ Goldziher, Ignác, *Az Iszlám*, p. 155.

⁸⁵ Machiavelli, Niccoló, *The Prince* - Translated and Introduced by Tim Parks, Penguin Books, UK, 2014, pp. 93-96.

⁸⁶ Nurudeen, Lamini, *History of Hadith Forgery*, p. 15.

⁸⁷ Goldziher, Ignác, *Az Iszlám*, pp. 157-158.

⁸⁸ Nurudeen, Lamini, *History of Hadith Forgery*, pp. 15-16.

⁸⁹ Jamaluddin, Idri – Jamaluddin, Arif, *Political Dynamics in the Hadith Transmission: Hadith Scholars and Orientalists' Perspectives*.

⁹⁰ Brown, Daniel W., *Rethinking tradition in modern Islamic thought*, p. 96.

⁹¹ Brown, Daniel W., *Rethinking tradition in modern Islamic thought*, pp. 96-97.

⁹² Simon, Róbert, *Történetírás az iszlámban*, p. 143.

⁹³ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 84.

⁹⁴ Brown, Daniel W., *Rethinking tradition in modern Islamic thought*, p. 94.

⁹⁵ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 84.

⁹⁶ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 84.

process required a break with local customs legitimized by *ijmā*, which placed also the *ra'y* itself at a disadvantage. Nevertheless, logic continued to play an important role in selecting the appropriate traditions.⁹⁷

According to Cahen, Al-Shāfi'ī's work⁹⁸ had the greatest influence on Islamic law.⁹⁹ Presumably, the *isnād* also gains its position as a criterion for the authenticity of the *hadith*. The *isnād* was used as the first formal element of *hadith*. Its essential element was to support its authenticity, yet it was Al-Shāfi'ī who, with his argument, firmly advocated its critical examination.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, in his groundbreaking work *Kitāb al-Umm*, he definitively rejects the use of *ra'y* and, among the means of logical reasoning, recognizes only *qiyās* as a source of law.¹⁰¹ Thus, a solid framework of the system of Islamic legal sources is formed: Quran, *Sunnah*¹⁰², *ijmā* and *qiyās*.¹⁰³ The *hadith* thus becomes such an important element that even obscure parts of the Quran are beginning to be explained using these traditions. This method also affects Hanafi practice, thus soon causing the extinction of living traditions.¹⁰⁴

As a result of this process, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, loyal to the Abbasids, went so far as to advocate in his teachings an exclusively literal interpretation of the *hadiths*, on the basis of which any interpretation that does not come from the sacred writings should be avoided.¹⁰⁵

This is complicated by the fact that during this period there are already a plenty of traditions in common consciousness and usage, making the issue of authenticity a central one. *Hadith* scholars have developed several methods to examine this, but all of them rely on the *isnād* emphasized by the work of Al-Shāfi'ī.¹⁰⁶ The Abbasids strongly supported the development of the sciences of *hadith* (*'ulūm al-hadīt*), emphasizing that their dynasty was the legitimate heirs of the Prophetic *Sunnah*. The consolidation of *'ulūm al-hadīt* not only resulted in the consolidation of methodological principles for examining the authenticity of *hadiths*, but also in the formation of the first large collections.¹⁰⁷

And the increasingly strong legal presence of *hadiths* was related to Abbasid legitimacy. The development of *hadith* sciences helped traditions that conformed to their preferred principles to become authentic and, in parallel, to become an increasingly prominent source of law. The propaganda material produced by many hostile religious political parties and sects was selected and filtered at the state level, which strengthened their position.¹⁰⁸ By proclaiming themselves the heirs of the Prophetic *Sunnah*, they may have felt they could exercise power over the law.

The *hadith* – which became a central element of jurisprudence – proved to be a truly revolutionary tool. The tradition has proven that it is capable not only of justifying change, but also of bringing it about.¹⁰⁹ It was shaped by sensitively reflecting on the smallest changes in society, while simultaneously changing the society of the *ummah*. Ignoring this resulted in the decline of the Abbasid Islamic Empire. The closing of the door to *ijtihād* resulted in the rigidity of law, which – having lost the flexibility borrowed from living traditions – no longer provided answers to the ever-changing problems of society.¹¹⁰

8. Law and society

The religious-political debates that led to the outbreak of the Abbasid Revolution were closely linked to social problems and issues raised by religious law¹¹¹. The reason for this is that *Sharia* not only regulated

⁹⁷ Jany, János, *Klasszikus iszlám jog – Egy jogi kultúra természetrajza*, pp. 76-78.

⁹⁸ Falus, Orsolya, *The Legal Institutions of Charity in the Traditional Islamic Law*, Dobra Knjiga, Sarajevo, 2020, p. 15.

⁹⁹ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 85.

¹⁰⁰ Brown, Daniel W., *Rethinking tradition in modern Islamic thought*, pp. 94-95.

¹⁰¹ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 85.

¹⁰² In form, but in content, like *hadith*.

¹⁰³ Hillenbrand, Carole, *Az iszlám – Új történeti bevezetés*, p. 120.

¹⁰⁴ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 85.

¹⁰⁵ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 85-86.

¹⁰⁶ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 86.

¹⁰⁷ Duderija, Adis, *The Concept of Sunna and its Status in Islamic Law*.

¹⁰⁸ Simon, Róbert, *Történetírás az iszlámban*, p. 143.

¹⁰⁹ Brown, Daniel W., *Rethinking tradition in modern Islamic thought*, p. 96.

¹¹⁰ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 87.

¹¹¹ Falus Orsolya, „*Waqf as a Traditional Legal Institution for Social Responsibility According to Natural Law*”, *Islam and Democracy* 22 (85/86), Slovenia, 2017, p. 87.

society¹¹², but also permeated every aspect of it.¹¹³ However, the formation of a true Muslim society could only begin at the beginning of the Abbasid era, when the organization of the empire also involved the establishment of institutionalized Islam.¹¹⁴

The issues raised in this regard were of a public law nature, the central element of which was the designation of the custodian of social hegemony. And indeed, the Muslim society, the ummah - as a symbol of the realization of the divine nomos - is like a religious legal filter that itself legitimized its leader.¹¹⁵

The Abbasids had two paths open to them when organizing their state: ancient Eastern despotism, or the Muslim ummah based on the Quran and prophetic traditions.¹¹⁶ At the beginning of their rule, they tried to portray themselves as ancient Eastern despots. As a result, intellectuals knowledgeable in religion and religious law began to perfect the system of Islamic orthodoxy in such a way that, through the means of *ijmā* - as community consensus - and so the prophetic traditions, the Islamic ummah would not only survive, but would also gain increasing emphasis in legitimacy.¹¹⁷

However, the spread of these doctrines and legal principles was hindered for a time by the Mu'tazilah doctrine, which al-Ma'mūn made the state religion and which, placing itself above religious scholars and *ijmā*, proclaimed the primacy of the Quran, which could be known through reason and rationality. The doctrine, by prohibiting disobedience by subjects, served the caliph well in his quest for despotic power, but the idea failed in the 9th century. Yet, as a patron of ancient sciences and philosophy, it deeply infected the Islam.¹¹⁸ The Mu'tazilah defeat meant not only the victory of the ummah and Islamic orthodoxy, but also - in the opinion of Róbert Simon - the victory of jurisprudence.¹¹⁹ After this, the Abbasid caliphs took great care to conform to the image of the caliph of the newly emerging theocratic state, thus theoretical works on the caliphate were born, and the golden age of Islamic law arrived.¹²⁰

The Abbasid Islamic empire also needed the development of jurisprudence, as the Quran - which was a central element of the theological doctrine of the Mu'tazilah - alone was insufficient to implement the religious revolution it proclaimed.¹²¹ With its continuous change, society is increasingly moving away from the ummah of the age of revelation. However, the elevation of the hadith as a source of law allowed society to become an Islamic community in such a way that, through this traditionalist instrument of law, the ummah itself became the depository of hegemony. Thus, scholars of Islamic jurisprudence (*fuqaha*) become representatives of society and, through the hadith, also shape it.¹²²

However, power could not be distributed in a way that would have led to stability. The caliph, as the head of the executive power, is the protector of the law, embodying the supremacy of Islamic law, to which he is, however, also subordinate.¹²³ However, Sharia, as revealed law, cannot be changed, it can only be interpreted, so only legal science can deal with it.¹²⁴ Thus, through the interpretation and elaboration of law, the *fuqaha* came to the fore¹²⁵, becoming the intellectual elite of the newly emerging Muslim society.¹²⁶ However, the legal elite has neither executive power nor independence, and is always vulnerable to the support of the ruler. However, the dependence is mutual, since the ruler can only be legitimized by that society, the depository of which is the elite of legal scholars.¹²⁷

The *fuqaha*, by developing the legal principle of social legitimacy, also chained themselves to the ummah. Law had to be dynamic, rapid, and sensitive to social changes, but it also had to necessarily resonate with the genesis of Islam.¹²⁸ Until the 9th century, jurisprudence successfully accomplished this, but when living

¹¹² Simon, Róbert, *Politika az iszlámban – A muszlim társadalom anatómiája*, p. 20.

¹¹³ Simon, Róbert, *Politika az iszlámban – A muszlim társadalom anatómiája*, p. 8.

¹¹⁴ Simon Róbert, *Iszlám kulturális lexikon*, p. 13.

¹¹⁵ Ibn Khaldun, *Al-Muqaddima – Bevezetés a történelembe, Arab eredetiből fordította, bevezette és kommentálta*, pp. 26-27.

¹¹⁶ Simon Róbert, *Iszlám kulturális lexikon*, p. 14.

¹¹⁷ Ibn Khaldun, *Al-Muqaddima – Bevezetés a történelembe, Arab eredetiből fordította, bevezette és kommentálta*, p. 26.

¹¹⁸ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 96.

¹¹⁹ Simon, Róbert, *Politika az iszlámban – A muszlim társadalom anatómiája*, p. 23.

¹²⁰ Jany, János, *Klasszikus iszlám jog – Egy jogi kultúra természetrajza*, p. 32.

¹²¹ Goldziher, Ignác, *Az Iszlám*, p. 127.

¹²² Simon, Róbert, *Politika az iszlámban – A muszlim társadalom anatómiája*, p. 23.

¹²³ Hillenbrand, Carole, *Az iszlám – Új történeti bevezetés*, p. 123.

¹²⁴ Goldziher Ignác, *A muhammedán jogtudomány eredetéről*, p. 10.

¹²⁵ Hillenbrand, Carole, *Az iszlám – Új történeti bevezetés*, p. 123.

¹²⁶ Simon, Róbert, *Politika az iszlámban – A muszlim társadalom anatómiája*, p. 23.

¹²⁷ Hillenbrand, Carole, *Az iszlám – Új történeti bevezetés*, p. 123.

¹²⁸ Ibn Khaldun, *Al-Muqaddima – Bevezetés a történelembe, Arab eredetiből fordította, bevezette és*

tradition increasingly began to be displaced from practice, the paths of law and society diverged.¹²⁹ The fuqaha, which had hitherto formed a bridge between the caliph and the ummah, collapsed. Society was no longer the guide to the development of law, and law itself no longer shaped society.

9. The flourishing of society

“Eventually, the power of the Umayyads was destroyed. The ‘Abbāsids gained the upper hand. Luxury, then, increased. Sedentary culture emerged, and disintegration made its appearance.”¹³⁰

Under the Abbasids, not only jurisprudence but also Muslim society experienced the Golden Age.¹³¹ The social unity was created along fracture lines and served as a cultural melting pot in which, in addition to traditional Arab and Islamic values, the ancient Iranian and the Hellenistic heritage of Byzantium also strongly influenced its formation.¹³² This had a fruitful effect on the development of culture and society, so science and art could flourish and education could be organized under the Abbasids, and the city of Baghdad could become not only an empire, but also a scientific and cultural center.¹³³ Until the 9th century, jurisprudence responded sensitively to the flourishing of society, thus successfully reproducing the utopian social order based on the will of Allah.¹³⁴ However, law, which had become rigid due to the lack of living traditions, became separated from society, which also resulted in a separation from the executive power in an empire based on theocratic organization.

The development of secular culture (*adab*) is itself based on traditions. The term *da’b*¹³⁵, as a custom or tradition, was initially used as a synonym for sunnah, which meant ancient customs to be followed by descendants. In the Arab empire of the Umayyads, it already took on a cultural aspect, thanks to which, by the time of the Abbasids, it already denoted a secular culture opposed to religious sciences. However, this culture no longer belongs solely to the Arabs, but also to the citizens of the ummah, enriched by the traditions of other peoples of the Abbasid Caliphate.¹³⁶

Literature became the primary medium of the new culture, for which the emerging empire itself produced its own readership. There is no data on what percentage of the urban population could read, but it is certain that an active reading class had developed in society already in the first century of the Abbasids. The first readers came from the intellectual class who practiced the professions necessary for organizing the empire. As state organization, public administration, and law developed, more professionals were needed, who contributed to the development of urban culture through literature, and so it became increasingly popular, and the number of readers grew even further.¹³⁷

As long as religious law and society were closely intertwined, Islam could impose strict limits on *adab*. By the 9th century, however, society and religious law had drifted apart to such an extent that the barriers to *adab* literature collapsed. Entertainment became increasingly the focus, which also had an impact on scientific literature.¹³⁸ The long *isnād* became obsolete and slowly fell out of practice, so historical works intended for lay readers were published without it. The long *isnād* became obsolete and slowly fell out of practice, so historical works intended for urban civilian readers were published without it. The historical chain was broken and the focus shifted from the past to the present.¹³⁹

This is how the Islamic society of the Abbasids loses its roots. However, its echo in art brings a renaissance of Jahili poetry, which, through the words of tales and poems, yearns to return from the city to the desert,

kommentálta, pp. 26-27.

¹²⁹ Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 85.

¹³⁰ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah - translated and introduced by Franz Rosenthal*, Princeton University Press, USA, 2005, p. 384.

¹³¹ Aldila Binti Isahak, *Internal Factors of the Abbasid Caliphate (750-850 CE)*, International Islamic University, Malaysia, 2015/2016.

¹³² Simon Róbert, *Iszlám kulturális lexikon*, p. 14.

¹³³ Aldila Binti Isahak, *Internal Factors of the Abbasid Caliphate (750-850 CE)*

¹³⁴ Halverson-Goodall-Corman, *Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism – The Jahiliyyah*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2011.

¹³⁵ Plural: *adab*.

¹³⁶ Simon Róbert, *Iszlám kulturális lexikon*, p. 20.

¹³⁷ Simon, Róbert, *Történetírás az iszlámban*, p. 139.

¹³⁸ Simon Róbert, *Iszlám kulturális lexikon*, p. 21.

¹³⁹ Simon, Róbert, *Történetírás az iszlámban*, p. 125.

amidst the shadows¹⁴⁰ of the glorious past.¹⁴¹

10. Conclusion

The religious, political, and social forces that destroyed the Umayyad empire bequeathed countless forms of crisis to the Abbasid era. However, these crisis points were necessary and useful forces in the service of the Abbasids on the path to the formation of classical Islam.¹⁴² The development of orthodoxy and jurisprudence played a key role in the creation of the Islamic empire, which, by sensitively responding to social processes, preserved tradition while paving the way for development. The primary means of this was the elevation of prophetic traditions to the status of a source of law, which, by creating variants of the revealed divine norm, could act as a Janus-faced institution to guard over the Islamic social order.

Jurisprudence, with its propositions based on social consensus, became the custodian of the ummah, while organizing and governing it through the filter of Sharia in mutual dependence with the executive power of the Caliph.¹⁴³ However, by rejecting living tradition, jurisprudence fell behind social development, and thus, after the development of adab culture, it fell into decay in parallel with the society that lost its roots and the political disintegration of the caliphate. And Islam's absolute view of history, clinging to the precise moment of genesis, fulfilled its destiny, as its longing for the past crushed the future of Muslim society in the Abbasid Caliphate.

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¹⁴⁰ Drory, Rina, "The Abbasid Construction of the Jahiliyya: Cultural Authority in the Making".

¹⁴¹ Goldziher, Ignác, *Az iszlám története*, p. 6.

¹⁴² Cahen, Claude, *Az iszlám*, p. 77.

¹⁴³ Brown, Daniel W., *Rethinking tradition in modern Islamic thought*, pp. 2-3.

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